Cut your fantasy football drafts into quarters

A whole bunch of stuff we don't talk about enough

How to build a winning fantasy football team in a draft setting is such a fascinating discussion point that gets talked about in a variety of ways, but also is complex enough that I’m not sure it ever really gets the attention it deserves. If you’re in a league with an 18-round draft, say, you get to make 18 bets. Those 18 bets are not equivalent, and what you’re looking for in different areas varies greatly.

On a very base level, everyone understands the simple facts that you want and need to hit on your early picks, and get very good players when you have them available, and then you’re also probably going to need to hit on some sleepers to round out a very good roster. But those very simple tenets get very complex really quickly when you start thinking about the things we think we know about different pockets of the draft, and the ways fantasy football analysts have tried to research past trends.

So much of what makes a person good at fantasy football comes down to feel. To be really blunt with you here, there are many analysts, whose research I really respect, who are quite simply not very good at fantasy football. There are always explanations for different things, like autopicks or what have you, but it’s difficult to explain the sheer number of industry drafts and those types of things that I’ve seen over the years where the people making the picks aren’t just sly like a fox — for years I would have chalked it up to them knowing something I don’t — but are instead making decisions that are just pretty clearly making their particular builds less likely to be winners. And I guess the only real reason I can feel confident enough to say that is experience, because again, so much around this topic does come down to feel.

The point of this article has nothing to do with other analysts’ skill as actual fantasy players, and my saying that is not to hammer those people, because I think most casual fantasy players are infinitely worse. It’s to make the point that it’s a very difficult thing, and even smart people who spend a ton of time with it aren’t just naturally going to weigh different probabilities correctly, or understand how different realities have impacted past data, or how heavily they should care about some research that’s been done as more than a tiebreaker in a given spot versus being something to go out of their way to reach and address and basically build a whole draft strategy around at a given point, because that move just has to be made.

But this offseason, I wanted to set out and try to address all of that in one big piece. I’ve written this before, I’m sure of it, but the very first piece of advice I ever got in fantasy football, after sending in an email to RotoViz that was very long and featured every grievance I had with the ways fantasy football was analyzed, was to not try to answer all the questions fantasy football has to offer in one piece. And that advice was imperative to my early success, as it always helped me keep my often-teetering-on-the-edge work more focused. But this newsletter has basically become the opposite, right? I sort of got big enough, and my style developed enough, that in some ways I try to do exactly that with every piece I write, because it’s just my style to go down 17 rabbit holes and talk about the interconnectedness of everything with so many tangents that I can’t get back to my main point. (Remember the concept of tacit knowledge?)

I don’t usually write outlines, and I don’t work with editors anymore. I don’t structure what’s in my brain, as you know. But I do think through the direction I want to go with different pieces, and this is one that I started to write a little mini-outline for, and I just see so many different, important topics fitting into. It’s going to end up being way too long, and yet I’ll remember after the fact the two or three things I wanted to include in it that I just didn’t get in there. Here goes.

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You should probably think about your draft in halves

I’m going to contradict this later, but let’s start here. There’s a massive difference between what you can accomplish in Rounds 1-9 of an 18-round fantasy draft, and what you can accomplish in Rounds 10-18. In 2025, the fantasy football market is what I’d call mature. That doesn’t mean there isn’t value, but there are fewer layups.

I’ve written about how different the WR profiles are in the draft’s two halves, in all the draft strategy work I’ve ever done (links to my most evergreen content here). There’s a meaningful difference in the RBs that are available, particularly as it relates to expected workloads. If there are any truly elite profiles at the onesie positions — yes, late-round QBs and TEs can hit, but they almost always hit despite real concerns and warts in their profile, and the ones that just profile as elite are simply different — they go in the single-digit rounds. There are minor exceptions, like when the market is too low on rookies and gives you great prices on Jayden Daniels, Brock Bowers, and Bucky Irving in the same season, but we don’t get those opportunities forever. Those edges get sniffed out and those doors close.

As far as how you approach a draft, you’re looking at the first half or so as the picks where you need to build a real core, and then the second half or so as the picks where you’re less confident in the hit rates, because a whole lot of the picks in the double-digit rounds are just not going to amount to much. There are differing approaches in the two areas — some people like to prioritize trying not to have misses, while others (like most of us around here) are prioritizing upside in both halves, sometimes at the expense of floor early and because of the lack of floor late. But even when prioritizing upside early, we’re talking about upside bets that still have some semblance of a floor, for the most part (or else they are just bad picks in the single-digit rounds, probably).

The point is that what you’re trying to accomplish with earlier picks is fundamentally different than what you’re trying to accomplish with late picks, and that realization helps drive home the idea of opportunity cost in the high-leverage rounds that I’m always talking about. You have 18 bets in an 18-round draft, but also many of the later ones are going to be situational bets, and the first half of your draft is where opportunity cost really comes in. So you have even fewer good bets, actually. You just have so little opportunity to build all the things into your roster that you need to, is the point.

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The relevant history of fantasy football is not that long

One reason for why there’s still value in a mature market is how much research is done into past fantasy football trends, particularly on a positional level, with very little understanding for how to apply that research as this market-based game continues to evolve, and the sport itself does, too.

People like to talk about Elite TE trends, without understanding what that’s actually saying. In the first decade of the 2000s — the aughts — tight end as a pass-catching position was still an evolving concept. There wasn’t a TE who caught 75 balls in any of the 2001, 2002, or 2003 seasons. Then we had Tony Gonzalez and Antonio Gates, and then Jason Witten, but by my recollection, those guys didn’t necessarily get drafted super highly in that era of fantasy football.

I say “by my recollection,” because one of the odd realities of fantasy football research is we don’t have great historical ADP data, nor do we really understand stuff like “win rates” versus just sheer fantasy point totals, so a lot of the stuff that’s looked at isn’t even all that reflective of a long enough timeline of controlled data. We’re starting to get more consistent data from best ball contests and those things, but most of that is reflecting less than a decade of trends. And basically every analyst acknowledges that every season is it’s own complex outcome, with the reasons for a variety of things working or not working in fantasy coming down to things that weren’t necessarily due to the play itself.

I always like to bring up the 2015 season, where Devonta Freeman was not just the most important RB but probably the most important pick overall, and yet he only scored 21.4 PPR points per game, the lowest figure for the overall RB1 basically ever (side note: Saquon Barkley scored just 22.0 last year). But what made Freeman’s 2015 so impactful was the rest of the position around him doing so terrible — there wasn’t another RB in the entire NFL who played at least 8 games and averaged even 17.0 PPR points. Freeman would’ve been a great Round 8ish pick in almost any season, but because of how bad all the other RBs were (particularly the very best ones at the top), Freeman looked like the most important pick in that entire range, in a way that made even other successful Round 8 picks look like they were bad picks simply because the people drafting them were not drafting Freeman, the most-important RB of the year.

Back to the Elite TE thing, in 2011, both Rob Gronkowski and Jimmy Graham burst onto the scene, and at different points over the next half decade those guys did have strong ADPs, and were really the start of the Elite TE data. Since then, you have Travis Kelce, you have George Kittle, you have Zach Ertz, you have some Darren Waller years, Kyle Pitts got up there in ADP that one year — what I’m arguing is the entire history of “Elite TE” data is like 30 player-seasons wrapped up in like 8-10 individual player careers. Everything you’re being sold about what Brock Bowers or Trey McBride may or may not be relies on the arcs of an extremely small sample of other TEs that looked like them, except also none of them really looked like Bowers, right? I mean the arc of the position itself has shifted; Bowers just had about 40 more catches in his rookie season than any TE in the NFL had over a three-year stretch less than 25 seasons ago.

How robust do you think 25 seasons of data, or 30 player-seasons, or 8-10 player careers is? Particularly as the position itself is being used more in a league with evolving offensive trends?

I’ve written about “Elite TE” data before, but basically as it relates to what’s possible. People like to use that past data to argue Elite TE basically can’t be a winning strategy, but I know (from experience) that Jimmy Graham was a great late first-round pick to build around in 2013, because he gapped the position, and that Travis Kelce in 2021 and especially 2022 was a great first-round pick to build around, because he gapped the position. That’s essentially all that is relevant about past Elite TE data, that if the conditions of the 2025 season are such that Bowers gaps the position, then he’s going to be worth his ADP (interestingly, how much of a league-winner he’ll be will come down to whether some RB or WR in the same range becomes even more important at their respective position, like how in 2013 Jamaal Charles actually became the right answer in the earlier part of the first round, where Graham drafters didn’t even have a chance to take him, because Charles went absolutely nuclear in the fantasy playoffs; that should obviously register as not being at all relevant to whether it made sense to draft Graham that year, but rather just a small sample artifact, because it’s mostly just random that what Charles did as a first-round RB happened in the same year, 2013, as the massive Graham season, rather than the circumstances of the 2015 RB landscape happening in the monster Graham season, which I can’t think of any valid reason to argue couldn’t have also been possible).

These same concepts can be drilled into across everything we know about positional trends — including my work on the RB Dead Zone, but that’s why I used every single RB across 10 seasons when I did the initial work, and then updated that multiple times in the years since, with a ton of careful data cleaning and contextual notes through the process, in what was (I must unhumbly say) an infinitely more rigorous process than the quick coding trends you see about 75% of the time these aggregate trends are discussed. That is a direct criticism of others’ work (while elevating my own, no less), and for someone who does it a lot I will still always say I do truly hate doing that, but it has to be said.

The conclusions drawn from so much of this type of research incorporate so, so much noise. It gets masked behind positional things like “Elite TE” or “Dead Zone RBs” but the underlying data is so few actual data points, and misses key contextual factors like how injuries impact outcomes, or how the draft market has shifted, or how the sport itself has shifted and why that’s impacted the results we’ve seen. If one really wants to be able to use this kind of research to be predictive — and not just get industry pats on the back for finding some “trend” that is merely descriptive of why the next year’s ADPs look like they do with only incorrect implications about how to play it in the future — then one must be willing to analyze the data with a bit of an artistic approach, not going exactly off what the numbers say but doing what I called “data cleaning” above to better control for all the variables that impact all the individual pieces of data we have. And even then, the conclusion should be merely, “This is what is possible,” not the extremely strong (and idiotic) certainty we so often see.

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More about how the market has matured

In its short history, fantasy football has been studied so relentlessly — and exponentially so over the past half decade as Underdog has led the utter explosion of best ball — that some mistakes have been made, as I wrote, but also we have a much better understanding of what we’re doing. The “wisdom of the crowd” element that ADP reflects is stronger in some key ways in 2025 than ever before.

One of those, I’d argue, is drafts have gotten a lot sharper at the top. The case of Saquon Barkley last year is so fascinating. He was the player who most resembled busts of the past, as reflecting by a ton of analysts seeing him that way. I’m not even trying to say that was wrong or bad analysis — I was one of those analysts, and I’ve worn that, but it was shocking to me throughout the season to see how many other analysts wore it, too, because I didn’t realize, even a little bit, how much consensus there was there, until he hit like he did.

The extent of what I want to say here is even if he was the very worst profile to be getting drafted in the top 20 picks relative to the types of things that made guys look like busts in those ranges in the past, the WOTC saw something else. I heard from some of those people last year, as I’ve written about, and a lot of their counterarguments amounted to, “I know this sounds crazy, but for me it’s as simple as this dude has never been in a situation this good, and this situation is going to be amazing for him.” Or, more simply, “Saquon + Eagles OL = profit.” (There were probably also some more advanced things, whatever. I’m not trying to backhandedly get at anyone who was correctly on Saquon last year. You nailed that shit.)

My point is that even if there were legitimate concerns with Saquon’s profile, the sheer fact that he was still going in the top 20 picks in this day and age reflected at least some league-winning potential, and that while that’s probably always been true on at least some level for all the top 20 or so picks in fantasy, that in 2025 it’s far clearer to me than it was in like 2015 or 2005 that trying to pick out “this year’s bust” in the top two or so rounds would be a futile endeavor, should that be a goal. (To that point, if you think probabilistically, the guys who do miss near the top are mostly just bad luck. I feel fortunate I wasn’t as on Breece Hall last year, but I don’t think his season was anything more than hitting on the lower end of a range of outcomes.)

The guys at the top are the very best picks, because enough people say that they are the very best picks, and if enough smart people make compelling cases for why one guy should go over another, that’ll reorder quickly, too. A month or so ago, I had a fun moment realizing on Stealing Bananas that both Siegele and I liked Jahmyr Gibbs as probably the RB1 (I’m going to rank him that way when my first rankings release later this month); I just saw my guy Evan Silva make the same case yesterday; his price is going to rise. There are too many smart people evaluating this stuff, and it’s not like you’re going to get some amazing discount on what everyone else can see. If you think you have that at the top, you’re probably just fooling yourself.

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You should probably think about your draft in quarters, or something

I did a call with one of the Stealing Signals readers at the end of the year, where he wanted some help analyzing why one of his rosters didn’t quite crush in his most important league. The main reason he was struggling with it was on paper, he got so much right — I can’t remember all the players, but this roster played all the hits from about Round 4 or 5 through about Round 9, and then also had some late-round smashes. I remember it had Chase Brown, and I think it had Bowers (or McBride?), and I assume like for so many Stealing Signals readers that Bucky was there, and I think maybe even Jayden Daniels. It was a sweet team.

But the first two or three rounds were just the landmines. Again, I can’t remember who exactly, but I’m pretty sure it was either Breece or Tyreek Hill in the first round, and then I remember it was also pretty much the worst pick in Round 2, whoever that was. I just remember looking at it like, “Man, the issue here is that in a year where all these top picks scored, and everyone else’s team got good if not great seasons out of the very best players in fantasy football, you got nothing.” It was really that simple.

There’s that old adage that you can’t win your league in the first round, but you can lose it. I think that’s an oversimplification, like I think everything is, because my brain is broken. But especially in a year like 2024, where so many of the early-round picks did hit, it was pretty true. As I said in the last section, I don’t necessarily believe that it was anything other than bad luck if you hit those busts, and I guess I’m making that point in part because I think that’s especially true in 2025 where the first-round profiles extend well into Round 2, and there’s also not some huge tier break after about the 1.05 like there is some years. Ja’Marr Chase is the 1.01 for most people, and I think that’s fine, but I think there are about six guys the market could have landed on where I also wouldn’t have questioned it.

Anyway, that was really all there was to say to that Stealing Signals reader. It’s stuck with me because of how great an example it was of how the person didn’t need to learn the wrong lessons; they’d executed a really strong draft strategy, and just kind of gotten screwed by early-round variance.

That early-round section is so important, and it’s distinct from the rounds that come after it, which is distinct from the range right after that. I wrote in the earlier section about cutting your draft in halves that I was going to step on that concept later, and that’s because you should be cutting it into four quarters.

The ideas below aren’t some novel points, but I do think breaking it down this way is probably a step closer to helping some of you understand where and why draft mistakes are made. It’s also something that’s come up often in my first few Offseason Stealing Signals writeups this year, where I’ve talked about the opportunity cost still being too high in some parts of the draft, but not others, and probably how those areas don’t necessarily feel all that different (but they are).

So here is this “draft in quarters” concept.

First quarter: Rounds 1 and 2, maybe 3

Elite profiles. The stuff that gets all the focus from the broader fantasy football world, but in truth it kind of doesn’t matter who you take, or at least the profiles overlap so much that the differences in “right” and “wrong” are so much different than at other points in the draft. A lot of the time we talk about working back to front, and thinking about what you want to do in later rounds, to help you gameplan what positions to hit here at the top, but there are always other factors.

If you’re only in one league, maybe you want to get your guy, and that’s fine. If you’re in a ton, maybe your pick in a given league is to balance exposures, and that’s fine in this range, too. If you’re in multiple leagues, you’re probably aware of where you’re able to get exposure to different guys, which makes ADP values that crop up — like when a guy falls to you a half-round later than you expected in this area — pretty enticing, as well.

In truth, I’ve never as a fantasy analyst felt that strongly there’s a right or wrong way to play the first couple rounds, and especially not now, when the market is good at evaluating the very best profiles (it’s always been pretty good, but it at times used to keep aging guys up there a year too long, etc.). I do pretty typically think about the later rounds, and how I want to set myself up in a given draft environment, but I’ll also let the draft come to me early if there’s an opportunity to build with a certain player that I don’t usually take but he’s at a nice value.

Second quarter: Round 3-4ish through about Round 8

Still very strong profiles throughout, but we start to see the inclusion of pretty clear profiles to avoid, specifically because of how you have to pass up the other still very strong profiles that are available throughout this section (i.e. opportunity cost is still very high, and many league-winners at various positions have come from this range over the years). For the most part, those profiles to avoid are players who lack the relevant upside, even in scenarios where things break favorably for them in their given offenses.

This does not mean they lack the upside to score really well, or be important parts of teams that win fantasy leagues, because all the types of profiles in this range, even the ones to avoid, are good profiles, either because they are from good offenses, or the players themselves are good, etc. When I talk about guys in this range disparagingly, it should go without saying that I don’t think people are just wrong to value that guy in some way, or that if that guy was being drafted in what I’m about to call the third quarter (or especially the fourth quarter), that I wouldn’t draft that guy. But this area overlaps with the RB Dead Zone, and those are definitely some of the profiles I’m referring to. (One of the things we’ve seen in recent years is some Dead Zone RB profiles falling out of the second quarter entirely, and suddenly looking different in the third quarter. I’ll get to that.)

As far as who you should take in this area, this is the meat of your whole build. Every single pick has to be deliberate, and because fantasy leagues are only won by one team out of usually 12 (or sometimes more), what very often needs to be deliberate about the pick in this range is that it’s a player who could be a star of the season, and be going in the first quarter the next year. That’s really the key — you’re looking for first-quarter talents that are going in the second quarter for reasons that are pretty dubious.

If you want to win your league, you probably need to finish your season with at least about five players that will go in the first quarter the next year. Next year’s first quarter is not going to be made up of exactly two or three players from every team’s roster, because some of your leaguemates will have teams that have nobody that is worth being drafted that highly next year, and some will have one. Because of this natural imbalance that will be created, in trying to win your league, you need to be seeking ways to create first-quarter profiles in areas that are not the first quarter, and obviously the easiest way to do that is in the second quarter, because there are only so many Bucky Irvings in the late rounds, right? So while your leaguemates seek out “safe,” “guaranteed” volume in this range, crossing off some unknowable “need” on their checklist (unknowable because what you think you need on draft day in a fantasy league is not likely to be what your roster actually needs in-season), an important point is you do have to lean into risk here, because you have to maximize your potential of finding those first-quarter profiles.

If, in looking back at a draft after the year, you see that cost you a “safer” pick that would’ve given you some second-quarter production, it’s easy to feel like you lost your league by not just taking the “sure thing”; I’d argue that’s exactly wrong. The reason we don’t need to target low-upside players who may only return second-quarter production in this range, or care about them when they do provide that kind of value, is because second-quarter production is far, far more replaceable from picks in the third and fourth quarter, or off waivers. No matter what, if you’re going to win your league, you’re going to need some things to go right. When you take on risk in this range, even if it comes with some downside, you’re also betting on your later picks to replace what you lost here.

It’s important to understand this tradeoff, because this is arguably the most important quarter of all four, and picks in this range of drafts cannot be wasted. Even the people who win leagues with some of those wasteful types of picks do it because they did hit on some other upside profiles elsewhere; you’ll sometimes just lose to your brother-in-law because the four decent upside profiles he took all draft all hit, and then he had some balanced picks around that parlay that gave him enough first-quarter profiles overall. But that type of team won despite those high-floor, low-upside type second-quarter picks, which just made their path more difficult, even when that player scored decently and finished above ADP in a way that doesn’t matter, and they look like an important part of the build.

What I’m arguing is you can’t take replaceable production in this range. That’s why it’s so important to get some WR depth here, when other “detours” can’t be justified, because WR is the position that is least replaceable outside Quarter 2.

But if you purely seek those profiles that don’t have upside in this range, I’d posit you can just simply lose your league right here. Your path to winning gets way too thin (unless you’re playing in a league of idiots that sort of just give you all the waiver options and a few lopsided trades).

Third quarter: Round 8-9ish through about Round 12 or 13

I keep saying “-ish” and making these ranges flexible because not all leagues or league types or drafts are alike. That’s yet another reason so much of the aggregate data on structural builds and those things is silly; how to classify a “Zero RB” build (which I choose as it’s obviously the sexiest build) is such a challenge, and for example in best ball it should probably be different earlier in the offseason than later because of how RB ADPs rise, and all sorts of those types of little quirky things that blur the lines in ways that are very real and important but if you bring them up most people will say you’re trying to fudge the data, and that a rigid definition need be stuck to, when that rigid definition is instead bringing in noise, failing to properly clean the data from the important variables that impact it, and dramatically altering conclusions.

I digress again, so let’s get into Quarter 3. Long-time fantasy players will see this as a key pocket of drafts where what I’d call good research has argued there’s a QB Window, where you’re probably looking at TE if you haven’t addressed it with an elite, where there are definitely “Zero RB” profiles at that position, and where WR probably is drying up, but sometimes you can still find an upside profile or two that isn’t being properly valued.

But in a range where all positions are very on the table, your approach is heavily influenced by what you’ve done up to this point. Wide receiver is the position that is most difficult to address here, no question, and yet if you have not adequately addressed it yet, you’ll probably be taking your chances here. Tight end is probably the next most difficult to address here, or at least in this range you’re often talking about profiles that don’t provide significantly better opportunity than what you can get in Quarter 4. (That wasn’t necessarily true in 2024, where the deep group of elite profiles pushed down that TE8-TE10 group that included Bowers into this range, and I argued that group was better than the TE4-TE6 group most years, something I think is probably accurate about the TE4-TE6 group, or perhaps TE5-TE7 if I can fudge that a little, in 2025.)

The RB position is the Quarter 3 profile to hammer. That’s because, quite simply, it’s the clearest position where a third-quarter pick can return first-quarter results, and be a top-25 overall pick the next year. These are those “Zero RB” picks that don’t project for enough volume to go higher, but have profiles that look really enticing if situations break right.

Another interesting group of RBs that has fallen into the third quarter of recent years is the veteran RBs with guaranteed volume. Maybe that was James Conner last year; the poster boy for this group was Josh Jacobs in 2022. The existence of this group, defined by a characteristic that they would’ve been multiple rounds more expensive a decade ago, has led many to say that the Dead Zone no longer exists, or has shifted — I would disagree with both depictions, and frankly strongly, but I’ll save that for another day.

But the backs that used to be second-quarter Dead Zone backs that fall into the third quarter are backs I’m willing to take shots on, because in the third quarter it’s not as necessary to take picks that have first-quarter ceilings. It’s still important, because you still only have 10 or 12 picks by the end of this quarter to have found your five or more first-quarter producers, but if you’ve adequately loaded up with upside swings through the second quarter, you can be looking at third-quarter profiles that provide some floor of production and feel like those replacement second-quarter producers if some of your big second-quarter swings strike out completely.

Fourth quarter: Round 13+

This is the range of drafts I probably least need to explain here, because it’s loosely the range we’d call “sleepers” or think of as the late rounds. Some years, you can find a real upside onesie option back here, or you can definitely hit on an upside RB. There have also been late-round WRs who have smashed, like rookie-season Puka Nacua, so don’t let it be said I’m claiming any trend is 100% accurate. It’s just very much the case that of the many, many WRs who are drafted in these rounds every year, the vast majority do not move the needle.

In 2025, it’s once again a “jam in the rookie RBs” situation back here. I didn’t write the same piece as last May this year, because “Hammer the rookie RBs in all formats” was a headline I’d already used for a 2024 where all the top RBs stayed healthy and Bucky and Tyrone Tracy were still big hits. I probably should just write that piece again, though, because the health of the older RBs in 2024, and then the strength of the 2025 rookie RB class, only made this an even clearer thing to be doing in 2025.

The reason I want to be jamming the rookie RBs, is many of these picks are going to be cut in a managed league, and I’m basically just taking huge swings back here, hoping to find breakout stars. Like I said, that could come at any position, but it’s most straightforward at RB, where so much of it is workload, and the young guys can see the workloads shift there way over the course of a season (like Irving and Tracy last year).

In some cases, you can also replace second-quarter expected production from back here, but I think the mistake many make is they instead take late-round picks that really only have the potential to replace third-quarter production, and probably that’s not a goal to pursue at all, because you should more or less be thinking about the third quarter as replacement level off the waiver wire (and by extension, the fourth quarter as below replacement level, and guys you’re very willing to move on from if they don’t pan out, and explicitly do not want to be roster-clogger types that are difficult to cut but limit your in-season flexibility).

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Final thoughts

As I said earlier, there are definitely things I didn’t get into this piece that I’m going to think about later. I’m going to do the “don’t let great be the enemy of good” thing and just wrap up here, knowing most of you can connect the dots between the things I did write and what I didn’t necessarily tie in.

But I wanted to get this framework I’d been toying with written up and sent out, because while I mentioned none of it is particularly novel, I do think it’s a good way to think about all the concepts from all the years of drafting, and what you’re trying to accomplish when you’re actually making your picks.

Until next time!